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h1ESSACES IN SENDER-RECE[VER GAMES:
.4N EXPF.RIMF,NT
Abatract
This paper experimentally investigates the evolution of the mean-
ing of inessages in sender-receiver games of common and divergent
interests. Meaning ia viewed as an equilibrium phenomenon and an
equilibrium as the reault of a dynamic procesa. Hypotheaea concern-
ing outcomes and dynamica are investigated using evolutionary game
theory. Reaulta indicate that efficient communication emerges endoge-
nously; providing population hietory information accelerates this pro-
cesa. There is considerable support for the theory in common intereat
gamea. Using probit models to investigate the dynamics, population
history and past individual atrategies are used by players. Past suc-
ceasea are more helpfulin predicting behavior than failures but neither
are as important as population history. For games with divergent in-
teresta, there is leas aupport for the theory. Theory is not unanimous in
ita predictiona and faila to capture certain salient features of thP data.
The size of the message space influences the equilibrium selected: how-
ever,the degree ofdivergence ofinterest between senders and receivera
and receivers' prior beliefs about sender types also influence the equi-
librium selected. Finally, initial conditiona play an important role by
eatabliahing coordination precedents that are deciaive in both game
typea. For divergent interest games, initial play impacta the outcome
obtained.separating or pooling.I
Two ~avages. who had never beea taught to speak. but had been bred
ny r.~motF. from lhr sonelies of inen, would naturally begin to torm
ihai Inn~tunqe by which they would endeavour to make their mutual
wants mtelligible to euh other. by utterinq certain sounds, whenever
they meant to denote certan objects. [Adam Smith]
In Gke manner are languages gradually estabtish'd by human conventions
without any promtse. In Gke manner do gold and silver become the
common measures ot exchange. (David Hume]
1 Introduction
We experimentally investigate the endogenous evolution of the meaning of
costless messages in a class of simple games of communication called sender-
receiver games. [n sender-receiver games a privately informed sender sends
a message to a receiver who then acts in response to the message. The
sender and receiver obtain payoffs that depend on the private information
of the sender and the receiver's action, and not on the message sent. For
these games, we derive a series of hypotheses concerning the Gmiting out-
comes frortt evolutionary game theory. Inspired by this theory, we formulate
hypotheses about the dynamic process itself.
We arP interested in communication because of its pervasiveness. [ts im-
portance for mediating economic transactions is apparent; it has been com-
pared to the role of money. We choose the game theoretic approach because
recent advances in game theory provide both a framework for formal analy-
sis and a source of testable predictions. We choose to study sender-receiver
games because communication is a prerequisite for achieving efficiency in
these games.t We adopt the evolutionary perspective because it does not
assume the existence ot a commonly known language. Given the multitude
o(PVOlutionary models o(communication, an experimental investigation can
It~ll u~ under what circnntstances these models are approprjate. Further, the
empirical approach may provide discipGne and suggest directions for research
íu this literature.
The evolution o( natural languages, professional languages and transac-
'One could ask why we ue not studying the emergence ot coordination ia strategic
torm games: atter all, the games we analyze have a strategic [orm representation. There
rre two responses. Fitst, sender-receiver games compriae a rich class of games with a weH-
drvrloped theory. Second, when we report the history ot play to the players, we report
actions snd not strategies. This diatinction seems to be important in prutice and would
disappear if we went directly to strategic totm games.z
tion specific languages are of interest to economists. Pidgins and creoles
ara examples of natural languages which evolved when European languages
came into contact with local languages during the European mercantile ex-
pansion. Professional languages, e.g. the language used by a manager who
must provide a financial report on his firm for its shareholders, continue
to evolve. So do languages relating to specific transactions such as job in-
terviews. Whinnom [1971] and Coulmas [199Y] stress the analogy betwPen
biological and Gnguistic processes and the need to adopt "... an evolution-
ist view of language which assumes that speech communities adapt their
language to the communication needs at hand. ..." Coulmas (1992].
Communication plays a prominent role in the general game theoretic
Gterature. It has been cited, Aumann [ 1989], as a mechanism for equilibnum
attainment in a game. Second, adding communication to a game may strictly
enlatge the set of equilibrium payoffs, equilibrYUm enlargement, Aumann
[1974], Myerson [1989] and Forges (1990a,1990b]. Thirdly, communication
may play a role in selecting among multiple equilibria, equilibrium selection,
Schelling [1960].
Sender-receiver games, introduced by Crawford and Sobel [1982] and
Green and Stokey [1980], comprise a rich class of games extensively studied
in theory and widely used in applied situations to study issues ofinformation
disclosure in accounting, economics, finance and political science, e.g. Dar-
rough and Stoughton [1990], Stein [1989], Farrell and Gibbons [1990] and
Austen-Smith (1990]. Communication is essential in sender-receiver games
because it allows the receiver to condition his actions on the sender's mes-
sage; unlike in complete information coordination games, communication
cannot stop once coordination is achieved. Without communication the re-
ceiver would simply best respond to his prior beliefs. In common interest
games, for example, where the incentives of the sender and the receiver are
perfectly aligned, communication significantly enlarges the set of equilibria
relative to the trivial game in which the receiver can only rely on his prior
beliefs. However, while communication enlarges t11e set of equilibria, there
is no guarantee that it will be effective in the sense that messages have
distinct meanings. All the original uninformative equiGbrium outcomes re-
main; the receiver can simply ignore the sender's message and therefore the
sender does not care about which message to send and "babbling" is a best
response.
Standard refinement techniques are of little help. Babbling equilibria
are perfect and even proper, Blume (1993). Even strategic stability does not
rule out uninformative equilibria in general. One response to this difficulty3
i: to admit messages whose meaning is given outside oC the game, Farrell
f 199aJ. ~latthews. Okuno-Fujiwara and PostlPwaite [1991]. Alternatively,
ecolutionarc game theory lets meaning evolve endogenously. This requires
one to conceptualize a dynamic process of how meaning becomes attached
to messages. The advantage of this approach is that one deals with a closed
model which holds the promise of providing a more solid foundation for
making predictions in sender-receiver games.z Dynamic stories, e.g. Can-
ning [1992] and Ndldeke and Samuelson [1992), are attractive because they
offer the promise of a theory of both equiGbrium attainment and equiGbrium
;election. Static solution concepts, e.g. W~rneryd [1993] and Blume, him
and 5obel ( 1993], which formaGze the key intuition of the dynamic stories
are attractive because they do not require faith in a specific dynamic rule
and because they are easier to manipulate.
We study two classes of games: games of common interest, with a unique
Pfficient payoff point, and games ofdivergent interest, where the sender's and
the receiver's interests over equilibtia are opposed. Among the common in-
terest games we focus on two types, one in which the receiver has a pooGng
action distinct from his separating actions and one where he does not. We
ask the following questions: How does meaning get attached to messages?
How well do the dynamic theories and static solution concepts perform? :~re
there "styGzed facts" about how players accompGsh meaning-message asso-
ciation? Does providing players with more information help them in their
task? Do more messages help or does a larger message space add to confu-
sion? What is the role of endogenously generated focal points? How well
do evolutionary stories per(orm off their domain, e.g. with human subjects
who process history information and engage in some form of deductive rea-
soning. These questions cannot be answered by a priori reasoning alone. An
experimental study can provide useful clues as to what features a dynamic
story should attempt to model and what characteristics might be missing in
rhP rurrently available stoties. bíoreover, there are a number of predictions
~~~miwm tu all the presently available dynamic and implicitly dynamic sto-
ries. ;`t the cen~ least we wish to know how these predictions hold up under
experimental scrutiny.
We find considerable support for the theory in common interest games;
7The applicstions of sender-receiver games predate the evolutionary literatute and
instead rely on ad hoc rules for equifibrium selectioa. Besides being ad hoc, ehese rules
tend to conflict with equally ad hoc rules tor refining equitibria in seadeo-receiver gamea
based on literal meanings. The evolutionsry approach holds the poteatial [or a more solid
[oundation for making predictions in theae games.4
meaningful and therefote efficient communication emerges endogenously and
providing population history information accelerates this process. K'e use
probit models to investigate the dynamic process. Population histon~ and
past individual strategies help predict players' behavior. Past succPSSPS in
individual matchPS are more helpíul in predicting behavior than past fallufes
but neither are as important as information about population history. for
games with divergent interests there is less support for theory. The theory is
not unanimous in its predictions and fails to capture certain saGent features
of the data. C'onsistent with theory, the size of the message space influences
the equiGbrium selected, separating or pooGng. Contrary to theory, for the
pooGng outcomes, the way in which senders conceal their types varies by
message space size. The degree of divergence of interest between senders
and receivers and receivers' prior beliefs about sender types also influence
the equiGbrium ,elected. Finally, initial conditions play an important role
in both types of games by estabGshing decisive coordination precedents.
2 Theory and Hypotheses
ln the games we analyze, the sender's private information is described bv
the sender's type. A type t is drawn from a finite support T according to a
distribution a(.); in our discussion types are equally likely. The sender sends
a message m E M to the receiver, who takes an action a E A in response to
the sender's message; M and A are assumed. to be finite sets. Payoffs do not
depend explicitly on the messages sent. a strategy pair for the sender and
the receiver is a Nash equilibrium if the strategies respond optimally to one
another. If an equilibrium is such that each type of the sender is identified







~Levna [I969) introduced a special clasa of sender-receiver qames in which the receiver
haa as many actiona as the sender haa types and payoffa for both players are maximized i(
and only if the receiver's ution "matchea" the sender's type. Lewis refers to a separating
equilibrium as a signaling convention if it is used regularly in tepeated sender-receiver
gamea. According to him such conventiona can come about either through expGcit :gree-
ment, salieace or precedent.5
Figure I gives the oayoffs of a simple common interest game ( Came I) as a funrtion of the sender's type, t„ and the receiver's action, a~. If, for example, the true type is tt, then the receiver's optimal action is a.z. .an
example of a separating equilibrium in this game is one where the sender
sends mt E Af if he is of type tt and m2 otherwise. and where the recF~iver
takes action a2 after message m~, and at otherwise. All of the Pxplicit and
implicit dynamic theories that we consider predict separation in Game l.
Canning ( 1992] and NSldeke and Samuelson [1992] look at expGcit rules
for adjusting behavior in a setting where players are repeatedly matched to
play a given sender-receiver game.4 Common to these works is the assump-
tion of random mutations which results in an ergodic process with a unique
stationary distribution.s Predictions are in terms of the Gmiting stationary
distribution, as the mutation rate goes to zero. Both papers show that in a
subset of these games ( which is itself a subset of the class of common inter-
est games Gke Game 1) the Gmiting distributions of their dynamic procPSSes
support only efficient outcomes.s
The evolutionary stable strategy ( ESS) [:vlaynard Smith, 1982] is the
first static solution concept that was used in evolutionary game theory,
and has inspired numerous others..' An ESS is characterized by stabiGty
against invasion as long as the proportion of invaders is sufficiently small.
To illustrate the role of ESS in Game 1 suppose that the message space
is given by .N -{mt, mZ}. Then this game has two separating equilibria
and infinitely many uninformative equilibria. The separating equilibria are
~trict and therefore satisfy every conceivable refinement; there are unin-
formative equilibria which are strategically stable and consequently proper
and perfect.a Because the separating equilibria are strict, they cannot bP in-
vaded; any other equilibrium can be invaded because it will involve multiple
'They build on work by Foster and Young [1993], Young [1993] and Kandori, Mailath
and Rob [1993].
' l,inguists have recognized thst '... evolutionary processes in biology and Gnguistics
arr rcplicable and deuribable in terms ot minimal mutations ..., whèther intrusions from
thr outaide or generated within the system, whose spread is controlled by tutors of 'ad-
vantage' or lack o( disadvantage. which are mesaurable only relatively. by reterence to the
envirooment." [Whinnom. 1971, p.91]
sStrictly speaking, Canning usumes that there is a nominal sigealing cost for every
message.
'Hoth ESJ and NSS (discusaed below) are defined tor a single-population model but
ran br rxtended W a two-population model in which agenta play an aaymmetric game.
"F'arrell's refinement u not appropriate both because ot the limited size o[ the mesaage
space and becaux messages have no Gteral meaning; with a large message space and
meaningful messagea Farrell would predict separation.6
best repGes.
One problem of ESS is that if wP Pnlarge thP mPSSage sparP in this gamP
no E'.SSexist, b~~-ause all equilibria will invulve mull.iple best replies. :1 pure
,trateqy separating ayuilibrium can bP invaded by a strategy profile that rc-
sponds differently to unused messages. One might argue that this instabilitv
is spurious, since this invasion does not change the players' payoffs.
One way of dealing with this problem is to simply declare invasions of
this kind as benign. More formally, a neutrally stable strategy (NSSJ is a
symmetric Nash equilibrium with the additional property that the incum-
bent strategy is at least as good against a potential invader as the invader
is against itself. Wárneryd [1993] shows that in games like Game 1. with
an arbitrary finite message space, for a pure strategy equilibrium to be an
,1~SS, it must be efficient.
Blume, h:im and Sobel [1993] partially solve thr nonexistence problem
of ESS by using a set-valued solution concept, following and approach de-
veloped by h:im and Sobel [1992]. Set valuedness allows for drift in an
equilibrium component and guarantees the existence result for a class of
sender-receiver games with a large message space. The drift also implies a
greater degree of instability for an inefficient equilibrium and they derive
a stronger efficiency result than Wtirneryd. Somewhat more formally, the
solution concept is Swinkels' [1992] equilibrium evolutionarily stable (EES)
set. A set of equilibria is an EES set if it contains all profiles (potential
entrants) which are best replies to the post-entry population; here the post-
entry population is composed of primarily a population using a profile in
the candidate stable set and a small population of potential entrants. In
common intenest games, i.e. games with a unique Pareto efficient point,
every EES strategy profile must be an efficient equilibrium, and conversely
that the set of efficient equilibria is equilibrium evolutionarily stable.
The above discussion about static solution concepts and explicit dynam-
ical systems in evolutionary game theory yields our first hypothesis: IJplay-
ers ane repeatedly and rnndomly matched to play Came I with a message
space of size two. ~(M) - 2, observed play will converye to a sepamting
equilibrium. 9







~~~árnen~d's efftciency result does not extend to games where the cardi-
nalitv of the action space exceeds the cardinality of the type space and~or
where we admit mixed strategies.tu Game 2, with payoffs as in Figure 2,
for example also has a neutrally stable strategy which supports the pooGng
outcome in which the sender mixes over all messages and the receiver takes
action a3 after even. message.
In Blume. Iíim and Sobel, the issue is not the stability of a single equilib-
rium but the stability of an entire component as was discussed above. Thus,
in our Game 2, a pooGng .YSS would not be part of an EES set because it
belongs to an unstable component. ESS predicts separating equilibria since
they are the only strict Nash equilibria in Game 2. The works of Canning
and Vdldeke and Samuelson also ptedict separating equilibria.
From this we derive our second hypothesis: !J playera are repeatedly
nnd rnndornly matched to play Came 2 wíth ~(M) - 2, obaerved play urill







~~~hen we move from games of common interest to games in which the
.rudrr'. and th~~ recPiver's interesta over equilibria are opposed, the predic-
tiuns uf the wlutiun concepts are not as clear cut. Both ESS and EES sets
are sensitive to the size o( the message space. Let the payoffs in Game 3
ht~ a., in Figure 3. With only two messages, thPre are two ESS's and EES
set; rorresponding to the two separating equiGbria. With more than two
messages no ESS or EES set exists in this game. Blume, Kim and Sobel
show that if there is a nominal signaling cost which varies across messages
~o[Inlike Wàrneryd, we use neutrally stable serategies in mixed strategies in our discus-
sion of theory.8
only the pooling outcome is supported by an EES set in Game 3 with three
messages.'t t1 [t can be also shown that both pooGng and separating equi-
libria are VSS's no matter what the size of the message space. tiSldeke and
Samuelson's theory predict separation with two and pooGng with three mes-
sages, provided one limits drift through nominal signaling costs or similar
means.
Here, for a message space of a given size, we find that different solution
concepts predict different equilibrium outcomes and these predictions change
for certain solution concepts depending on the size of the message space.
Essentially, there is more theoretical support for the separating outcome
with two than with three messages because the separating outcome is strict
with two but not with three messages. We formulate our third and fourth
hypotheses to evaluate these solution concepts:
!f players are repeatedly and mndomly matched to play Came .y with
~(~L~) - 2, observed play will converge to a sepamting equilibrium.
Ij players are repeatedly and rondomly matched to play Game ,I unth
~(:N) - 3, observed play will converge to a pooling equilibrium.
The final hypothesis is inspired by the explicit dynamic theories and the
intuition underlying the static theories. The explicit theories combine the
current state and a fixed behavioral rule to determine the probability dis-
tribution over future states. They vary in what to include in the current
state, e.g. information from the last period only or from other prior peri-
ods, information on population behavior or individual behavior, etc.. To
motivate the investigation of these issues, we propose the following work-
ing hypothesis: IJ players am repeatedly and randomly matched to play a
sender-receiver game, then (i) in games oj common interest, the speed of
convergence to a separoting equilibrium depends upon whether information
on the past population dtistributtion oj stmtegies is available to the players,
and (iiJ in general, an individual's observed play in any given period will
t~An ESS does not exiat even íf there ia a nominal signalíng cost.
'~Blume (1994] ahowa for a different aolution concept, perturhed persutenca that the
aame elfect can be achieved with costleas measagea under an ejjeehve lanquage assumption-
Peraiatence, introduced by Kalai and Samet (1984], is a another static solution concept
based on intuition about dynamics. Peraistence predicta xparation in Gamea 1 and 2, and
in Came 3 with 2 mesaagea. Depending on whether one subxnbea to peroiatent equilibria
or perautent sets, it allowa both pooling and aeparating equilibria, or makea no prediction
in Game 3 with three meesagea. The aame predidions are obtained from a closely related
set-va(ued solution concept, curó (cfoaed under rot~onol behaviar) sets. Curb sets were
introduced by Baau and Weibull [I991]. Hurkena [1994] ptopoeed an explicit dynamic
which convergea almost aurely to a curb set.9
dFpsnd npon last period's population distribution of strotegies. lasl perind's
persona! strategy choice and its success or Jailure.
3 Design
i'he origin of evolutionary solution concepts is in biology although others,
e.g. Crawford (1991], ~Iailath (1992], have given these solution concepts
a learning interpretation. In either interpretation there is a tendency for
successful strategies to replace unsuccessful ones. There are no knowledge
requirements in the biological interpretation of these models. The learning
interpretation however requires some knowledge on the part of the agents.
For example, players need to be able to compare their actions with the per-
ceived consequences of their actions. This also implies certain informational
requirements; players need to know the current distribution of strategies in
order to judge the performance of their own strategies. Knowledge require-
ments also differ across the evolutionary solution concepts. For example,
in Blume, Kim and Sobel's approach they are considerably more stringent
than in W'~rneryd's theory. Potential entrants anticipate the consequences
of their entry in Blume, Kim and Sobel. For this to occur, players need to
know the structure of the game including the payoffs of both senders and
receivers.
.as the above discussion suggests, there is no uniformly accepted view of
the knowledge and information requirements across the evolutionary theo-
ries. ~Teither has there been any experimental work addressing the evolution
of ineaning in communication games. However, there is a considerable Gt-
erature on communication in standard game theory, e.g. Brandts and Holt
(1992]. Cooper et al. [1989], Dickhaut et al. [1992]. We build on the struc-
ture of the Cooper et al. design which has addressed issues such as common
knowledge, pairings of players and communication structures. In so doing,
we construct a design that satisfies the knowledge requirements of the evo-
lutionary theories to be evaluated.
In the expetiment, players are asked to participate in a sender-receiver
game such as the one in Figure 1. Each player's payoffs contingent upon the
sender's type are common knowledge and the numerical payoffs represent a
player's utility. We induce payoffs in terms of utility using the Roth-Malouf
procedure. Roth and l~talouf [1979] and Berg et al. [1986].t3 With this
~~Binmore and Samuelson [1993j discuss the relationship between the notion of repro-
ductive success in biological game theory and atility.io
procedure, each player's payoffis given in poínts and these points determine
rhe probability of winning a monetary prize. At the end of each period
of each game, a lottety is conducted where winning players receive ~1 and
losing players receive zero.t4
The experiment is conducted using a series of poputation cohorts. .all
players are recruited Gom undergraduate (sophomore and above) and grad-
uate classes at the University of [owa- Upon their arrival, players are seated
at separate computer terminals and each is given a copy of the instructions
for the experiment. Instructions for the treatments are found in appendix A.
Since these instructions are also read aloud, we assume that the information
contained in them is common knowledge.ts
A cohort consists of twelve players, six senders and six receivers. Each
player is randomly designated a sender or receiver at the beginning of a
game and remains so for all periods of the game. In each period, senders
and receivers are paired using a random matching procedure. Sender types
are equally likely and independently and identically drawn in every period
for each sender. Senders are privately informed of their type at the beginning
of each period. All random matchings and drawings (except for the lottery)
are done by the computer; players also eommunicate and rhoose actions
through the computer. Hence, no player knows the identity of the players
with whom he is paired, in either past, current or future pairings. The above
information is included in the instructions.
Each cohort participates in two separate sessions.'g In Session I, all
players participate in 20 repetitions (periods) of the two stage game whose
payoffs are shown in Figure 1. Prior to the first stage, senders are informed
about their respective types. In the first stage, senders send a message of
either A or B, M- {A, B}, to the receiver they are paired with. In the
second stage, receivers take action at or a2 after receiving the message ,.1 or
B from the player they are paired with. Each sender and receiver pair then
learns their respective type, message sent, action taken and payoffs received.
All players next receive certain aggregate information about the population;
in particular, all the sender types that are drawn and all the messages sent
~~Eac6 player waa given an oppor[unity to draw the lottery ticket the opportunity was
rotated among the playen.
"To provide additional aasurance regarding common knowledge, players are aaked to
anawer a set ot queations related to the inatructions, see Appendix A. These quesGons and
related anawen are reviewed betore a game ia conducted.
18Each cohort completed the two sessions in about one and one-hal[ to two and one-halt
houra. Paymenta to participanta ranged trom S9 to 532.11
bv the respecrive sender types. This information is displayed for the current
and all prvciou; periods of the session.
In Session [I, all players participated in an additional 20 repetitions (40
repetitions for Game 3 treatments) of a two stage game which differs from
the game played in Session I. An essential part of the Session I[ design is the
message space and its abiGty to ensure that at the beginning of the session
there is no common understanding of inessages among senders and receivers,
senders alone and receivers alone. This is guaranteed in the design by en-
dowing each player with his own representation of the message space and
order of inessage space representation.t~ The representation and ordering is
stable over the entire session and players are informed about the essential
properties of the representation in the instructions. The mapping used to
generate the player specific representations is best understood in terms of an
underlying, unobservable message space, M-{A, B}. Using the structure
of this underlying message space, fifty percent of the players see A as ~
and the other fifty percent see it as s. Similarly fifty percent of the players
see B as ~ and the other fifty percent see it as s. Regarding the order of
the message presentation on the screen, it is structured to have the effect
that for half of the players their representation of A appears first and for
the other half their representation of B appears first. For example, consider
a sender-receiver pair in which A maps into ~ for the sender and s for the
receiver; and the order of the message presentation is ~,s for the sender
and ~, s for the receiver. When the sender sends message ~ because it is
the message on the left (s because it is the message on the right), it will be
received as s(~) by the receiver and appear as the right (left) message. This
procedure destroys all conceivable focal points that players might use for a
priori coordination.18 As in Session I, all players receive the same aggregate
"Schelling was the first to emphasize the role ot labeling as a[ocal poiat and Crawtord
and Haller(1940] were the firat to syatematically atudy games in which players did not
have common knowledge ot labels aad positiooa.
'" Aa indicsted in the inatructions, terminology waa desigaed [or its neutrality. Sender
typea ue designated as column players. C1 and C2; receivers ue deaigaated aa row players
who take utioas Rl, R2 and (in Game 2 and Game 3) R3. The efficieat separating
equilibrium also appeua on the oR disgonal elements o[ the matrices. The observable
messaga ~ aad . appear on the top aet of computer keys ia that ordet, leít and rigàt
thus the design destroys whatever [ocal poinu ue created by the keyboard prexatation.
Technically, with a cohort of size 1'? and two messages the mapping aad ordering are as
follows tor the senders, detailed by player numbet, mapping ( A,B) and ordering (left,right):
21..íkl lik..). 3 1~.~1 (~.~).6l~,lk) 1i4t,~), e (~k..) (t~,~), l0 (~,ÁI) ('.i't) and 12
l;'k. ~1 l;rk, ~). For receiven, t (.. fk) (;fk. ~), 3 (;rk. ~). (~. ~k), 5 (~,;'k) (~k, ~), 7 (~, ~) (At, s),
9(., jk) (.,~) and 11 (~,.) (;bé,.). This mappiag and ordering destroys all tocal points.12
information about the population; all the sender types that are drawn and
all the messages sent by the respective sender types. This information is
displayed in terms of each player's own representation of the message space
and the order o( the message presentation. The information is provided for
the current and all previous periods of the session.
We choose the structure of Session I to provide players with experience
with experimental procedures, to ensura thP subject, understand the struc-
ture of a sPnder-receiver game, message space and population history and
finally to faciGtate coordination.19 As detailed in the results section, there
are interesting coordination issues even in Session I. For Session II, we con-
structed the representation of the message space and the order of inessage
presentation so that all conceivable focal points that players might use for
a ptiori coordination (e.g. Session [) are destroyed. Thus, Session II fo-
cuses on the rohorts' abiGty to develop a new language as a function of the
~ame being play~~d. We only report population historirs ahuut seuders to
all players (rPCeivPr information is not reported) bt~cause in a set of failed
pilots we reported complete histories. It is our conjecture that it is harder
to process the additional information. [f the full history is displayed, there
is an additional coordination problem; the two histories may suggest two
ways to coordinate. By only displaying sender history we implicitly suggest
which history to follow.
The design is structured such that treatments consist of three repGca-
tions. Each repGcation involves two sessions, as described above. Session [ is
common to all treatments and repGcations. Session [I varies by treatment.
The treatments are: 1) Game 1 with two messages and population history,
2) Game 1 with two messages but without population history, 3) Game 2
with population history and two messages, 4) Game 3 with population his-
tory and two messages, 5) Game 3 with population history but with three
messages.
4 Results and Analysis
We present results for the treatments in two parts. First, we examine the
equilibria selected. Second, we use the data to describe the dynamics from
Por example, if type C1 always choases the lett mesaage and type C2 always chooaea the
right message, there will be a 50-50 apGt on the ordering that appears on the sender and
receiver screens.
19fnitial pilot studies with a common interest game showed ehat players could not co-
ordinate without Session [.13
the :Pnder-receit.Pr games.
The data are organized by Session [. which is common to all treatments,
Game 1 with and without population history, Game 2. and Game 3 with two
and three messages. Figures ~l to 10 graph on a period by period basis the
(raction of senders and receivers who coordinate on the equilibrium selected
in the respective games (type-message and message-action association) . We
group all fifteen Session I's together and the three replications for Game I
with and without population history and Game 2. We performed Gkelihood
ratio tests and could not reject the hypothesis that the data from the repfi-
cations came from a common process.~o For visual presentation purposes
for Game 3 with two messages, we graph each repGcation separately; with
three messages, we graph the first replication separately from the other two.
4.1 Equilibrium Selection
When examining the equilibria sefected, we focus on the last five periods
for the Session I game, Game t and Game 2, and the last ten periods for
Game 3.21 For Session I(Figure 4), 93~ of the play is the separating
equilibrium.32 In seven repGcations of Session [, type tt sent message A and
in the other eight repGcations type tt sent message B. Thus, players make
no use of a"natural" focal point in Session I(e.g. message A might mean
type tt and message B might mean type t~ based on the natural orderings of
type and message space) and instead rely ón population history to achieve
coordination on the separating equilibrium selected.
For Game 1 with population history (Figure 5), 98010 of the play cor-
responds to the separating equilibrium. By repGcation, it wbs 95qo, 98oïo
'o As detailed in the dyaamica section, we used probit analyaia to inveatigate the dynamic
structure o( the treatmenta and replicationa. We pool by treatmeot since the likelihood
ratio teats írom ehe probit analysea could not reject the hypothesis thst individual repli-
cations were generued ttom a common proceaa. . ~
" We uae Fuher'a exut teat to determine whethet or not period dependence exiaq for
thr coordiaation reaulte. For the Seaaion f game. Came 1 and Game 2, we could reject
the hypothesis of independence compuing the firot ten and laat ten periods tor all three
treatmenta. Except [or Came 2, thu hypothesis u rejected when comparing periods 11-
IS and 16-10. However. we failed to reject indepeadence for the laat Rve periods ot the
treatmenta. llaing a aimilar procedure tor Gune 3, we failed to reject indepeadence [or
the last ten perioda tor all rephutions ot the tteatmenta. The level ot significance uaed fot
the Fisher exsce teat and all other testa included in the paper is p-.05, unlesa otherwiu
indicated.
~~Fot ehe fi[teen replicationa, twelve equaled or exceeded 909ó, two replicationa exceeded
80"Jo and one exceeded 70q.14
and IOOq. ~I'hus, from the Session [ game and Game 1, we have substantial
support for our first hypothesis; observed play in Game 1 with two messages
converges to a separating equilibrium.
When comparing Game 1 with population history to the game without it
( Figure 5), we find support for the first part of hypothesis five: the speed of
convergence to a separating equilibrium will depend on whether information
on past population distributions of strategies is provided. We chose Game 1
as the treatment here because players have a strong incentive to coordinate
in this game. In the treatment without population history, ~2q of play
is separating equilibrium play while it was 9801o in the history treatment.
Comparing the frequency of the separating equilibrium, itself, it is 96q with
population histor,y and 66oJ'o with just individual history.23 We also have an
empirical measure of the contributions o( the different levels of history in the
development ofa language for coordination. Given the expected frequency of
the separating equilibrium with no individual or population history is 30q,
individual history increases the frequency to 66Q1o and population history
increases it to 9R~o. tn terms of payoffs to the players, the contributions of
the different levels of history are 350. d95 and 672 points respectively.
In Game 2( Figure 6) there are two equilibrium outcomes, the separating
one and the pooling one. Our second hypothesis states the observed play in
Game 2 with two messages will converge to the separating equilibrium. 97010
of play follows the separating equilibrium. By repGcation, it is 92q, 100010
and 100q. While there was some initial play of a3, it declined quickly and
play of a3 in the last five periods was all due to one player.
Game 3 is a game in which the interests of sender and receiver over
equilibria are opposed; a separating equilibrium that is preferred over the
pooling equilibrium by the receiver and vice versa for the sender. Hypothe-
ses three and four state that with two messages, play will converge to the
separating equilibrium and with three messages, play will converge to the
pooGng equilibrium. Figures 7 and 8 present the results for two messages.
Replications 1 and 2 reach a separating outcome and replication 3 reaches a
pooling outcome.2~ By repfication equilibrium play is 99010, 78~ and 84q.
~'Comparing the treatments by repfication, the frequency of separating eyuilibnum
play and the separating equilibrium itself were always higher in the p„pulation hinturv
treatment. "
~'Replication 1 was stable and reuhed the separating equilibrium outcome in the lut
10 periode. When conducting repGcation 2, it became dear that the game was not stable
in the firot 20 periods. It waa then decided to conduct the rep6cation and all remaimng
Game 3 repócations for 40 periods.15
For the three message space treatment (Figures 9 and 10), replication 1
concPrqes to a separating outcome while the pooóng outcome occurs in the
other two repGcations. EquiGbrium play is ï3q. 77q and 95q by replica-
tion. Thus, the separating outcome occurs in two thirds of the replications
in the two message treatment and the pooGng outcome occurs in two thirds
of the repGcations in the three message treatment. Similarly, comparing the
frequency of equilibrium separating play by treatment, it is ó401o for the two
message treatment and 34q for the three message treatment.
We conclude that there is some support for hypotheses three and four;
separation occurs more often in the two message treatment, pooGng tuore
often with three messages. The separating equilibrium is strict in the two
message treatment but not in the three message treatment. Once the players
are in a strict separating equilibrium, their best replies are unique. It is
impossible to leave such an equiGbrium via a sequence of best replies. With
three messages, there are multiple best repGes. Theory does not account for
all aspects of the data. The pooling outcomes differ across treatments; both
messages are used in the two message treatment while only one message is
used in the three message treatment. As detailed in the next sections, the
initial play of receivers is also related to whether a pooGng or separating
outcome is obtained in the treatments.
4.2 Dynamics
In addition to the equilibria selected, we examine the processes which lead to
those equilibria. Figures 4-10 show a process which starts from coordination
by chance and progresses over time to almost complete coordination. This is
interesting because there areintuitively plausible rules for playing the game,
similar to those investigated by Crawford and Haller [1990) and Kramarz
[1992), which would in most cases lead to full coordination in period 2.
One such rule is to calculate the equilibrium on which most senders are
coordinated in the first period and to play according to that equilibrium
from then on. While we find no evidence that players follow this rule, the
initial coordination precedent predicts the equilibria selected in 24 out of 27
sessioas, and in 10 out of L'2 Session II's, excluding the no history treatment.
The (act that convergence is not instantaneous suggests that players adjust
their strategies over time.
Evolutionary game theory investigates a number of dynamics, includ-
ing the replicator dynamic and Nëldeke and Samuelson's dynamics. These
dynamics are highly styGzed and, purposely, not designed to quantify the16
contribution of a broad range of driving forces. For example, the repGca- tnr dvnamic is bnilt on the law of genetic inheritance, and it is difficult to
provide a learning interpretation for it. For that reason, it says little about
van.ing information conditions. Which factors matter in these adjustments
is primarify an ampirical question. We use hypothesis five as a guide to
investigate these factors [f players are repeatedly and randomly matched
to play a sender-receiver game, then (i) for common interest games, the
speed of convergence to a separating equilibrium will depend on whether
information is provided on the past population distribution of strategies,
and (ii) in general, an individual's observed play in any given period will
depend upon last period's population distribution of strategies, last period's
personal strategy choice and its success or failure.
We use a series of ptobit regressions to examine the relationships outGned
in hypothesis five.js We ask what factors determine the probability that
message mt (action ar) is sent (taken). [n the probit model this probability
depends on an intensity index mi (ai) which itself is a linear function of
a number of explanatory variables a; and an error with a standard normal
distribution; e.g., for senders
m~ - ao f~ a;z; ~ e.
~-t
The intensity index m~ itself is unobserved. It exerts its influence through
determining m,. [f we abuse notation and let mt - 1 denote "message m~
is chosen," and ml - 0"message mt is not chosen," then
J 1 ifm; ~0 m;-l
0 otherwise .
We estimate a similar relationship for the receivers by treatment, with a
replacing m and d; replacing a;. 26
~sCrawford (1993j uses ordercd probits to analyze game dynamics usinq experimental
data. Our approach is simílar in spirit; however, Crawford's specific techniques cannot
be dírectly appfied to our xtting because his data have an additional linear structure that his techniques could exploit. Roth and Erev [1993] compare experimental data with simulated data on game dynamics. While appropriate [or their settings, their dynamic does not readily accommodate the information condítiona of our design.
~tExttpt for the Game 3 treatments, we pool by treatment since Gkelíhood ratio tescs
could not reject the hypothesu ehat individual repGcations were generated by a common
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This model is used for the Session I game and Game 1. For Games 2
and 3 the following variable is added: as[(lm,fa,)-t~.
The independent variables are population, separation inertia, mes.sage
inertia. success and Jailure (and the pooling action in Game 2 and 3).
Population measures the fraction of the population of players who use mt
to indicate their type. !t, is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the
sender is type t; this period and 0 othetwise; (~(m`'t')ttc(„`7't7) )-t
and 6
(~fm7 t`)s~(m''t7))-1 measure the population frequency of revealing behav-
ior in the previous period. The separation inertia variable is constructed
analugously with (l~,,,~,t~) } I(,,,7,t7))-t and (!(m~,t7) }!(„y tt))-t measuring
the ittdividual's type-message association from the previous period. ï'he
messagc incrtia variable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the sender
sent mt last period and 0 otherwise. The success variable (essentially) mea-
sures whether last period a player used mt successfully to indicate his present
period type. The foilure variable (essentially) measures whether last period
a player failed to induce his preferred separating action with the alterna-
tive to mt. In Games 2 and 3 we use a sixth explanatory variable, pooling
induction, whicó measures whether the sender in question was successful in
inducing a3 with mt last period.is








~l,n,(!(mi.nt) f !(mz.az))-t i- lezll(.ni.,~zl f !(mz.n,))-t~
f i3J [(!at)-t~
f ;3q ~l,n,(!(mt.a,)!t~ fl~,nz.az)!tt)-t
~lmx(!(mz.a,)ftz f llm~~a])!t, )-1~
f l~s ~l,n,(!(mt,a~)!ts f-I(mz~ai)!tt)-t
flmz(!(mi.az)!tz f !(mt.a,)!t, )-t~
For the pooling repGcations of Game 3 the intensity variable for at
is replaced with the one for a3 and the variable ( !,t )-t is replaced with
Gn, (~;` )-t t l,,,z (~ 6' )-t t 1,,,~ (~ s' )-t. This jrequency variable mea-
sures the frequency of the currently received message in the last period.
The underlying notion is that in order for a message to be sent with very
high frequency, it must essentially be sent independent of type and should
therefore induce action 3.
The other independent variables are analogous to those for the sender;
population, sepamtion inertia, actíon inertia, success and jailune. The indi-
cator variables for the current period are in terms of the message received
and the lagged indicator variables record information about last period's
messages, actions and message-action associations.
Table 1 and 2 present the probit coefficients for senders and receivers.27
Interpretation of the coefficients is best understood through an example.
Looking at Table 1 for the Session I game, suppose we wanted to determine
"We used a runs test to evaluate tóe serial correlation of the error terms and failed
to reject the hypothesia of seria! iadependence. fieteroekedasticity of the errors across
players u also not a problem in the probite.19
rhe marginal effect that an increase in population last period of .33 has on
the probabilit~ of inessage mr being sent this period. Also, let us suppose
that la;t period population was .S and the individual did not usè mt to
indicate his present t}~pe, sent message l and failed. Csing the results of the
5ession 1 game probit, the marginal effect is
0(-1.~6f 1.63(.5)f.16t.69)(L63)(.33)-.21
where o( ~) is the ordinate value of the standard normal density. Thus, a.33
increase in pupulation last period increases the Gkelihood of an individual
;ending n:t this period by .2L C'sing Table 2, one could go through an
analogous calculation for a receiver.
.-1 quick interpretation of the magnitude of the coefficients can be ob-
tained as Collows. Take as a reference point the case where all values of
the independent variables except the constant equal zero. In that case the
probability of inessage mt being sent equals d'(ao), where ~(.) denotes the
CDF of the standard normal distribution. This amounts to a small proba-
bility if o is negative and large in magnitude. For example, the probability
o( message mt being sent when all the other independent variables take on
values of zero and ao --1.76 is ~(-1.76) which equals .04. If we could
change population all by itself from 0 to 1, it would increase the probabifity
of mt to ~( - L76 f 1.63) -.~t0. Thus, the population variable almost off-
sets the negative constant all by itself. Since all independent variables vary
between 0 and l and most assume only these two values, this exercise can
be conducted to show that most of the statistically significant coefficients
are also economically significant.
For common interest games, the impact of providing population history
to players is evaluated by comparing the two treatments of Game 1, with
and without population history. Consistent with hypothesis five, separation
inertia, suecea and failure but not population are significant in explaining
r~~urdinati~m without history for hoth senders aud receivers. .alternatively,
with history, population enters with a significant coefficient. Separation in-
ertia is still significant; however, failure is not and success is only significant
for the receivers. [t appeats that when provided, population history domi-
nates individual success and failure in determining whether message mt will
be sent. ~iessage and action inertia play no role in the process.
For the common interest games (Session I, Game 1 with history and
Game 2), we next evaluate the impact of population, separation inertia,
success and failure on the probability of inessage mt being sent and actionzo
at being taken. Population and separation inertia have large and statisti-
rally significant coefficients for senders and receivers. Further, the message
(action) inertia variable is not significant for five of the six probits. The
impact of previoas success and failure is not as clear cut. For the Session
I game, previous success and failure are significant for both senders and
receivers. For Game 'l, previous success and failure are significant for the
senders but for receivers only success is significant. For Game 1, only success
is significant and only for receivers.
We know that population (senders) history dominates success and fail-
ure from the no history treatment. Interpreting the results in light of this
observation, say, a player encounters a failure while conforming with the
emerging equilibrium. Responding to this failure implies disregarding the
population norm. Since receivers can respond directly to this information,
receivers are less likely to be swayed by failure than senders. On the other
hand, senders do not directly respond to history but best respond to what
they expect receivers' responses to be. Success is reinforcing for both senders
and receivers.
Thus, we conclude that previous population and individual strategies
are important in understanding dynamics in the common interest games.
Previous success and failure matters for senders but for receivers success is
more important. Finally, message (action) inertia has no explanatory power.
Evaluating the game in which sender and receiver have opposing interests
over equilibria, we divide our analysis between the separating and pooGng
outcomes. The dynamics of the separating outcomes share many of the
characteristics of the common interest games. Population is significant for
both senders and receivers. Separation inertia is significant in three of the
(our probits for senders and receivers. However, failure is not significant
and success is only significant for receivers in the two message treatment. In
the three message treatment, the importance of inessage inertia and pooGng
induction is due to the portion of the sender population attempting to pool
rather than separate.
Players develop different strategies in the pooling replications. In the
two message treatment of Game 3, senders develop a successful strategy
of uniformly distributing messages across types. This is accomplished by
having a given sender use a separating type-message association but having
the association be different for different senders.28 This is reflected in the
'"In the nezt xction, we describe a variation of Game 3 with two messages in which the
pooling outcome occurs in all three repGcstions. The xnden in all repficationa exhibit the same randomization o[ strategiea at the population leve! as uaed in the repGcation beingzl
~Pnder probit wherP rhe roe!ficient on separatiun inertia is positivP and ;ig-
nilirant. l-h~~ ruPtfirirnt on population is signifirant, nPga[ivP and largr~ in
Ittagltllqr)P- IIIIIIrating sPndPri 5~'sLPlnaLlfally p1lrsltPd a stratPgy of tfl~ing
to uffsPt rendencies to separatP in the population. Previous success is ;ig-
nificant and negative for receivers. The intensity index for receivers is the
pooGng action whirh Pxplains why the coefficient for previous success (at
separating) is negative.
For the three message treatment, senders develop a strategy of always
;ending the same message independent of type. The choice of which message
to wnd is Pstablished by thP mPSSagP most (requently used in the initial
period,. l his is Pxartly t.hP typP of pooling Pquilibrinm which is predirtPd
by BIumP, him and Sobel and by VSldeke and Samuelson. This behavior
manifests itself in significant message inertia and pooGng induction variables.
For receivers. the frequency variable is significant and success (at separating)
is negatively associated with the choice of the pooGng action. The negative
.ign for the failure variable is caused by the variable's construction; e.g. it
is zero whenecer the pooGng action is taken in the previous period.29
4.3 Game 3 Revisited
In Game :3, we find that initial actions by receivers predict the equilibrinm.
In thP initial periods, thP typP-message mappings do not statistirally diffPr
across the repGcations. However, the frequencies o( action :3 differ substan-
tially across the pooGng and separating replications. In the first ten periods,
the number of pooling actions were 4 and 16 out of 60 for the two separating
repGcations of the two message space treatment. However, 39 of 60 actions
were action 3 in the pooling repGcation. Similarly, for the three message
discussed.
-1~'e rlso ~nnsider higher ordet lags o( the independent variables. Aa a first pass the
~~rubn. wrrr rr-run by adding all the appropriately defined lag two independent variables.
h:~t)mating both models over the same periods, the average pseudo r-squared increbaed
trom .a0 to 4ti. ~~'ith the number o[ independent variables increaaed by 100q and the
~ ollinearity problems encountered by their introduction, particularly population history,
the mcrease m t-squated was deemed immaterial.
.~s an attempt to mitigate the collinearity problems with our only (stepwise) continuous
r~ariable. population history. we difterenced the second and third lag to determine their
margtnal corttribution beyond the first lag. Estimating the models over the same periods,
the average r-squared is .41, .42 and .43 (or lag one, Iag one plua the marginal (or lag
two, and lag one plue the marginal (or lag two and three, respectively. Assessing the
economic significance o( lag two and lag three by r-squared, they aze at best marginal.
T'he important (first order) effects are captuted by the lag one variables.22
treatment, the separating repGcation had 12 of 60 actions being action 3
while the pooling replications had 25 and '23 actions being action 3.
We conjecture that initial play is related to the degree of divergence of
interests between the sender and receiver and receivers' prior beliefs about
sender types rather than exclusively a function of inessage space size as sug-
gested by theory. In the spirit of Nóldeke and Samuelson's best response
dynamics, receivers begin with uniform priors and as history accumulates
they revise their beliefs, which become self-confirming in the :Vash equilib-
rium chosen later. For Game 3, if the receiver's belief p that the sender's
type is tt falls in the range 3~7 G p G~~7, then his unique best reply is
the pooling action a3. Outside of this pooling range, one of the separating
actions is optimal. The observed outcomes in the replications are consistent
with these priors as measured by initial play in the replications of Game 3.
Suppose we construct a new game, Game 4, from Game 3 by substituting
the sender payoff of 500 for ï00 in the separating equilibrium, leaving all
else the same. This change enlarges the pooling range to l~5 ~ p ~~1~5.
This substantially increases the Gkelihood of a pooGng action initially and
as a consequence the pooling outcome. With a message space of size two,
~(M) - 2, we predict more pooling in Came 4 than Game 3. The theorv
of section 2 still predicts separation. -
We conducted another treatment, Game 4 with population history and
two messages, using the same procedures as previous treatments. Again,
the observed outcomes in the replications are consistent with the priors as
measured by initial play. In equilibrium, 8ó010 of play followed the pooling
outcome; by replication, it was 93q, ï8q and 88e1o.~ In the initial ten
periods by replication, the pooling action was taken 30, 32, and 22 of 60
times respectively. As in Game 3, senders developed a successful strategy
of distributing messages across types. Thus, we conclude that while mes-
sage space size influences the equilibrium outcomes so does the degree of
divergence between senders and receivers and rec~ivers' prior beliefs about
sender types.
5 Conclusions
We investigated evolution of the meaning of inessages in two classes ot
sender-receiver games, games of common and divergent interests. Evolu-
'oUaias the same ptocedures as in the other treatmenta, we failed to reject independenc.. [or the laat ten perioda for all replications.23
tiunarv ~ame theory was used to develop the predictions for the treatments
conducted.
~~'e found considerable support for the theory in games of common inter-
est. In the absence of other means to coordinate, the fact that we obsPrve
convergence to an informative equilibrium itself suggests players best re-
spond to population history, albeit with inertia. Using probit models to
study the dynamic process, we find population history significant if and
only if players ate informed about it. Players continue to use strategies they
have used in the past, separation inertia. Past success in individual matches
are more helpful in predicting behavior than past failures and more so for
senders than receivers. However, neither are as important as information
about population history.
For the games with divergent interests, there is less support for the-
ory. This is due in part to the fact that theory is not unanimous in its
predictions in these games. Consistent with theory, we find support fot the
prediction that message space size influences the equi6brium outcome. How-
ever, the degree of divergence of interest between the sender and receiver
and receivers' prior beliefs about sender types significantly also influence the
equilibrium selected.
We observe both types of equilibrium outcomes, separation and pooling,
in both the two and the three message treatment. The nature of the poo6ng
outcomes differs across treatments. In the three message treatment, senders
adopt the strategy of all choosing the same message, which is consistent with
theory. For two messages, senders successfully distribute messages across
tvpes to prevent identification. Theory does not predict pooling here and
makes no prediction about the message strategies used. For the separating
outcomes, the dynamics are similar to those of the common interest games.
Population history and separation inertia are important; however, previous
failure is not and success is not as important.
[nitial conditions play an important role in both types of games. We
tind it surptising that in the 5ession [ game, the "focal equilibrium" whete
tt ;ends A was observed in only about 50q of the replications. This makes
tiession 1 interesting in its own right. In games with separating outcomes,
the initial coordination precedent is decisive in 23 out of 24 replications,
excluding the no-history treatment. For the pooling outcomes in the three
message treatment, the precedent for the commonly used message was es-
tablished in the initial periods. Finally, for the divergent intetest games,
the initial frequency of the pooling action impacts the outcome, pooGng or
,eparation.24
The analysis and results suggest additional issues to address. titanv
games of applied and theoretical interest are games of partia! common in-
terest; the sender wants to reveal some but not all information. Thus, these
games combine aspects of common and divergent interest games. The theo-
ries considered here make predictions for such games. [n view of our results,
it is an open question whether these predictions hold up under experimental
scrutiny. We would also Gke to investigate the dynamics in games of partial
interest, given the new type of equilibrium outcome in these games and our
observation that dynamics appear to be outcome dependent.
Currently, sender (but not receiver) history is displayed to all players.
What happens if we inform some or all of the players about the partial or
complete history of play? Varying this design feature should provide insigát
about how human learning differs from biological evolution. Finally, we
plan to examine different matching rules, e.g. one where individual sender-
receiver pairs remain matched for the entire series of repetitions, Crawford
and Haller [1990], Kramarz [1992J.zs
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APPENDIX A: INSTRUCTIONS FOR TREATMENTS
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SESSION I
(common to all treatmants)
You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision making. If you follow these ínstructions carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid to.you in cash at the end of the experiment.
The experíment will consíst of a series of separate decísion making periods. Each períod consists of two phases. In Phase I you w111 be paired wíth another person and, based upon the choíces you make, you will be able to earn points. In Phase II, you will have the opportunity to earn dollars based upon the points you earn in Phase I. We begin by describing Phase II so that you
understand how the points you earn affect the number of dollazs you earn. Then, we describe Phase I ín detail so that you understand hw to earn points.
Phase II Instructiona
At the end of Phase I, you will have earned between 0 and 1000 points accordíng to the rules we will discuss below. The number of dollars you earn in
Phase II will depend partly on the number of points you earned 1n Phase I and partly on chance. Specifically, we have a box which contains lottery tickets
numbered 1 to 1000. In Phase II, a ticket will be randomly drawn from the box. If the number on the ticket IS LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO the number of points you hava earned in Phase I, you WIN 51.00. If the number on this tícket IS GREATER
THAN the number of points you have earned in Phase I, you WIN 50.00. For example, if you have 600 points, you will have a 601 chance of winning 51.00. Notíce that the more points you have, the larger will be your chance of winning
the ~1.00 prize.
Phase I Instructiona
You will either be designated a Column player or a Row player at the start of the experiment. Once you are designated a Column player, you will remain a
Column player from one peziod to the next. Similarly, once you are designated a Row player, you will remain a Row player. In your folder you will find a record and profít sheet. On this sheet you wíll indicate, based on the message received on your terminal, whether you are a Row or Column player.
You will be participating in a series of separate sessions during today's
experiment. The current session vill consist of 20 periods. In each decision making petiod, you will be paired wíth another person. Each period, the computer
randomly determines which player you are paired with. If you are a Column player you will be randomly paired with a Row player. If you are a Row player, you will be randomly paired with a Column player. For example, if there are 12 people participating ín the sessíon, 6 will be Column players and 6 wlll be Row players. In any period, there is a 17i chance a particular column player will be palred with a particular row player. There is a 31 chance these two players will be paired together a second period, a.5s chance they wiil be paired for three periods and so forth.
You will not know the identification of the person you are playing agaínst in any period. Similarly, nobody in your decision making pair will know your identification in any period. Further, you will not be told who these people are39
either during or after the experiment.
Each period, the game wi11 proceed as follows: Flrst, the Column player will Learn which one of two payoff tables is being used this period. Next, the
Column player can send a message to the Row player. Fínally, the Row player selects an action which determines the points earned for both the Column player and the Row player for the period.
More specifically, at the beginning of each period, the payoff table is
randomly chosen by the computer. Each table is equally likely and as such has a 1 in 2(508) chance of occurring each period. Also, the payoff table for each
pair of players is determined by a separate, independent drawing. Since each
table is ídentified by a label-- CL or C2, the computer wíll inform the Column
player of [he table drawn for the period. The camputer will not inform the Row
player of the table drawn.
Next, the Column player will be given the opportunity to send a message to
the Row player about the table that was drawn. The Column player may choose to
send a message of A or B. After the Column player sends a message, the Row
player will choose an ac[ion. The Row player's action and the payoff table
determined by the table drawn at the beginning of the period determines the
number of points earned by the Row player and the Column player.
In the next part of the instructions we will be referring to specific
numbers of points. These numbers are the same as you will be usíng !n the first
session of today's experiment.
Specific Instructíons to the Columi Player
As a Column player, you will first be told the table drawn for the períod.
If for instance the C1 table was drawn, you would receive the following message:
The true table is ~-
Record this information on your record and profit sheet. The Row player will not
be ínformed of the payoff table drawn.
Nessage Stage
After the computer determines the true table, you will be gíven an
opportunity to send a message.
You will be asked:
Vhat vould you like to send9
A B
If you choose A, hit the A key. If you choose B, hit the B key. You may not
choose both A and B. After deciding which message to send, you will again be
nsked co verífy your response.
Actton Stage
After sending your message to the Row player, you vill enter the action
stage of Phase I. In this stage, the Row player will choose an action which will
determine the poínts you earn and the points the Row player earns for the period.
The Row player wíll choose action R1 or action R2. The Row player's action
choice will be dísplayed on your terminal by highlíghting the appropriate row on
the true table. The number of points you may earn is given by the folloving
tables for each action the Row player might select and each possible payoff
table. (Note that these tables appear with the appropriate label on your
screen.)40
Numbar of Points aarnad by tha Column Player
501 C1 S08 C2
Rov player's R1 0
action
R1 700
R2 700 R2 0
To read these tables, notice that the likelíhood of a given table occurring
appears in the upper left hand corner of each table. Since each table is equally
likely, each has a 1 ln 2 chance (508) of occurring. Next, suppose the payoff
table drawn was C1 and the Row player chose actíon R2. You would then earn 700
points. Similarly, suppose the payoff table drawn was C2 and the Row player
chose action R2. You would then earn 0 points. In a líke manner, you can use
these tables to determíne the number of points you would earn for all other
combínations of the Row player's actions and payoff tables drawn. The Row
players also earn poínts dependíng upon the payoff table drawn and the action
they select.
Once the Row player has selected his or her action and entered it into the
computer, the computer will determine the number of points earned by you based
on the table that was drawn. The result is then sent to you via your terminal.
The message will look like the one below:
You raceiwd - points.
At the end of the period, you are to record your point earnings for Phase I on
your record and profit sheet. The computer will also inform you about the action
taken by the Row player and the payoff table drawn at the beginning of the
period. You should record the payoff table drawn, the message sent to the Aow
player and the action choice of the Row player on your record and pzofit sheet.
Make aure you check your earnings in points against the computer's calculations.
Spscific Instructions for tha Rov Player
As a Row player, you will begin by receiving a message from the Column
player. The Column player can send a meesage of either A or B but not both. For
inatance, if the Column playar chose to send B, you would receive the message:
The columm playar sent: B
Aftar receiving this message, you will choose an action. You may choose
action R1 or action R2. The number of points you earn is given by the following
tables for each action you might select and each possible payoff table. (Note
that these tablea appear with the appropriate label on your screen.)
Numbar of Points aarnad by the Row Player
SOt C1 508 C2
Rov playar'a R1 0
action
A1 700
R2 700 R2 041
To read these tables, notice that the likelihood of a gíven table occurríng appears in the upper left hand corner of each table. Since each table is equally
likely, each has a 1 in 2 chance (508) of occurring. Next, suppose the payoff table drawn was C1 and you chose action R2. You would then earn 700 points. Símilarly, suppose the payoff table drawn was C2 and you chose action R2. You would Chen earn 0 points. In a like manner, you can use these tables to determine the number of points you would earn for a11 other combinations of your actions and payoff tables drawn. The Column players also earn points dependíng upon the payoff table drawn and the action you select.
When it is time for you to select an action, you will receive a message
stating:
You may choose 1-2. Your decision9
Enter the number of the row (1 or 2) you wish to choose. A light bar wíll
highlight your choice on the screen. You will then be given an opportunity to
verify your response.
Once you have selected an action and entered it into the computer, the
computer will determine the number of points earned by you based on the table
that was drawn. The result is then sent to you via your terminal. The message
wíll Look like the one below:
You recaived - points.
At the end of the period, you are to record your point earnings foz Phase I on
your record and profit sheet. The computer will also inform you about the payoff
table drawn at the beginníng of the period. You should record the table drawn,
the message sent by the Column player and your action choice on your record and
profit sheet. Make sure you check your earnings in points against the computer's
calculations.
History
Ac the end of each period, a history ínformation screen will display the
payoff tables drawn and messages sent by all the Column players. A history sheet wíll be provided-- on this sheet you are to record the frequencies for each
period.
For instance, suppose that for period 1 in the session, 3 of the Column
players drew table C1 and 3 drew table C2. AL1 6 of the Column players sent B
and consequently, all 6 of the Row players received B.
A Column player's hístoty screen will show
Table C1 C2
Hessage A B A B
Period
1 3
A Row player's history screen will show
3
Table C1 C2
Message A B A B42
Period
1 3 3
Phase II Recording Rulas
After completing your record and profit sheet for Phase I of a given
decision making period, you are to use the last two columns to record the dollars
you earn in Phase II. One person will be asked to draw a lottery ticket from the
box. Before he~she returns the ticket to the box, the number on the ticket will
be announced. You should record the number of the ticket in the second to the
last column of your record and profit sheet. If the number drawn IS LESS THAN
OR EQUAL TO the number of points earned in Phase I, círcle 51.00 ín the last
column; otherwise circle 50.00 in that column. Pay careful attention to what you
circle. Any erasure will invalidate your earnings for the period. If you do
make a mistake and circle the wrong number, call it to the experimenter's
attention.
To help you with your record keeping, the computer will summazize your
point earnings and lottery outcome at the end of each period. Use thís to verify
the information you recorded on your record and profit sheet.
At the end of the session, add up your total profit in dollars. All
dollars on hand at the end of the session in excess of S 0.00 are yours to
keep. This is [he amount of dollars you have earned in this session.
In summary, your earnings in tha experíment will be the total of the
amounts you win in all Phase II lotteries. The amount of money you earn will
depend partly upon luck and partly upon whether you have made good decisions in
Phase I. Notice that the more points you earn in Phase I, the more likely you
wíll win in Phase II. Are there any questions?
Questions
1. In each period, how does the computer pair a Row player with a Column player?




3. In each period, does the computer determine the payoff table for each column
player separately or do all column players have the same payoff table?
4. In each pariod, how does the computer determine the payoff table for each
column player?




6. 4Then the computer determines the payoff table for a column player,
a. does the column player know which table was chosen?
b. does the row player know which table was chosen?
7. When the column player sends the message A, what message will be received by
the row player?
8. When the column player sends the message B, what message will be received by
che row player?
9. Suppose for period 1 in the session, 3 of the column players drew C1 and 3
of the column players drew C2. All 6 of the column player send A.
a. what does the column player see on his`her history information screen
Table C1 C2
Message A B A B
Period
1
b. what does the row player see on hís`her information screen
Table C1 C2
Message A B A B
Períod
144
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SESSION II
Came 1
[The alternative order of inessage space presentatíon is in brackets]
This session of the experiment will again consist of a series of separate decision making periods. The current sessíon wíll consist of 20 periods. Each period will again consist of two phasea. In Phase II you will be able to earn dollars based upon the poínts you earned in Phase I in exactly the same way you díd in the first session. In Phase I, you will again be paired wíth another person and, based upon the choices you make, you will be able to earn points. However, Phase I in this session differs from Phase I in the previous session in the following way:
Specific Instructions for tha Columa Player
Nessage Stage
After the computer determinas the true table, you will be given an opportunity to send a message, e or ~ ( ~ or aJ. When you send a particular massage, a row player will always receive that message in the same way.
To select the message to send to the Row player, you will be asked:
fihat vould you lika to sandT
e N (,~ ,~~
If you choose e, hold down the shift kéy and then hít the a key. If you choose u, hold down the shift key and then h1t the p key. You may not choose both ~ and o. After deciding which message to send, you will again be asked to verify your response.
Phase I than proceeds in exactly the same way as in the previous session.
Specific Instructions for the Rov Playez
As a Row player, you will begin by receiving a message from the Column player. A partícular message from a Column player will always be received by you ín the same vay.
You will receive the message:
The colvmit player sent: e
oz The column player snnt: K
After receiving this message, you wíll choose an action. Phase I then proceeds in exactly the same way ae in the previoua session.
Histozy
At the end of each period, a history information screen will display the payoff tables dravn and messagea sent by ell the Column players. The history screen can be usad ín the same way as the previoua aeasion's history acreen. The hístory of the messages sent by the Column players are presented to you in your own representation of the messages. Thus, hístory inforos you of the frequency with which Column playera who drew payoff tables C1 and C2 send messages ~ and a. A hlstory sheet wíll be provided-- on this sheet you are to record the frequencies for each period.
For instance, suppose for period 1 in the session, 3 of the Column players drew table C1 and 3 drew table C2. The messages sent by the Column players in terms of your own representation of the messages show that all 6 of the Column players sent X.45
If you are a Column player, your history screen will show
Table CL C2
Message ~(~sJ x(~] ~[u] ~[~]
Period
1 3 3
If you are a Row player, your history screen will show
Table C1 C2
Message ~[a] ~(~1 ~(a) ~(~l
Period
1 3 3
All dollars on hand at the end of the session in excess of S 5.00 are
youzs to keep.
Questions
1. When the column player sends a particular message which is represented as a
~ to the row player, what message will be received by the row playert
2. When the column player sends a partícular message which is represented as a
n to the row player, what message wíll be received by the row player?
3. Suppose for period 1 in the session, 3 of the column players drew C1 and
3 of the column players drew C2. The messages sent by the column players
in terms of a player's representation of the messages show that all 6 of the
column players send ~.
a. if the player ís a column player, what does he`she see on his`her
histozy informacion screen
Table C1 C2
Message ~[u] t~[~] ~(~1 e[~1
Period
1
b. íf the player i s a row player, what does he`she see on his`her
ínformatíon screen
Table C1 CZ
Message ~(u] s[~1 e(~1 s[~1
Period
i46
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SESSION II
Game 2 and Game 3
Tfessage Space (e ~v)
[The alternative order of inessage space presentation is in brackets]
(For Game 3 replace Game 2 payoffs with those for Game 3]
This sessíon of the experíment will agaín consist of a series of separate
decisíon making periods. The current seasion will consist of 20 periods. Each
period will again consist of two phases. In Phase II you will be able to earn
dollars based upon the points you earned in Phase I in exactly the same way you
did in the first session. In Phase I, you will again be paired with another
person and, based upon the choices you make, you will be able to earn points.
However, Phase I in this session differs from Phase I in the previous
session in the following way:
Specifíc Instructions for the Column Player
Iiessage Stage
After the computer determines the true table, you will be given an
opportunity to send a message, u or e. When you send a particular message, a row
player will always receive that message in the same way.
To select the message to send to the Row player, you will be asked:
What vould you like to send?
~ e ~,s ,w]
If you choose ~, hold down the shift key and then hit the ~ key. If you choose
t~, hold down the shift key and then hit the t~ key. You may not choose both ~ and
a. After decidíng which message to send, you will again be asked to verify your
response.
Acrion Srage
After sending your message to the Row player, you will enter the action
stage of Phase I. In this stage, the Row player will choose an action which wíll
determine the points you earn and the points the Row player earns for the period.
The Row player will have three actions to choose from, R1, R2 or R3. The number
of points you may earn ís gíven by the following tables for each action the Row
player might select and each possible payoff table. (Note that these tables
appear with the appropriate label on your screen.)
Numbar of Points earnad by the Column Player
sot cl soa cs
Rov player's R1 0
actioa
R1 700
R2 700 R2 0
R3 400 R3 400
These tables are constructed in the same manner as the tables in Sesaion I.
Notice ehat the likelihood of a given table occurring appears in the upper left
hand corner of each table. Sínce each table is equally likely, each has a 1 in47
2 chance (508) of occurring. Next, suppose the payoff table drawn was C1 and the
Row player chose action R2. You would then earn 700 points. Similarly, suppose
the payoff table drawn was C2 and the Row player chose action R2. You would then
earn 0 points. In a like manner, you can use these tables to determine the
number of points you would earn for all other combinations of the Row player's
actions and payoff tables drawn. The Row players also earn points depending upon
the payoff table drawn and the action they select.
Phase I then proceeds ín exactly the same way as in the previous sessíon.
Specific Instructions for the Row Player
As a Row player, you will begin by receiving a message from the Column
player. A parcicular message from a Column player will always be receíved by you
in the same way.
You will receive the message:
The column player sent: ~
or The column player sent: e
After receiving thís message, you will choose an action. You may choose
action Rl, R2 or action R3. The number of points you earn is given by the
following tables for each action you might select and each possible payoff table.
(Note that these tables appear with the appropriate label on your screen.)
Number of Points earned by tha Rov Playez
SOi C1 SOá C2
Row player's R1 0 R1 700
action
R2 700 R2 0
R3 400 R3 400
These tables are constructed in the same manner as the tables in Session I.
Notice that the Likelihood of a gíven table occurring appears in the upper left
hand corner of each table. Sínce each table is equally likely, each has a 1 in
2 chance (508) of occurríng. Next, suppose the payoff table drawn was C1 and you
chose action R2. You would then earn 700 points. Similarly, suppose the payoff
table drawn was C2 and you chose action R2. You would then earn 0 points. In
a like manner, you can use these tables to determine the number of poínts you
would earn for all other combinations of your actíons and payoff tables drawn.
The Column players also earn poínts depending upon the payoff table drawn and the
action you select.
Phase I then proceeds in exactly the same way as in the previous session.
Nistory
At the end of each period, a hístory information screen wíll display the
payoff tables drawn and messages sent by all the Column players. The history
screen can be used in the same way as the previous session's history screen.
The history of the messages sent by the Column players are presented to you in
your own representation of the messages. Thus, history informs you of the
frequency with whích Column players who drew payoff tables C1 and C2 send
messages ~ and x. A history sheet will be províded-- on this sheet you are to48
record the frequencies for each period.
For instance, suppose that for period 1 in the session, 3 of the Column
players drew table C1 and 3 drew table C2. The messages sent by the column
players in terms of your own representation of the messages show that all 6 of
the Column players sent n.
If you are a Column player, your history screen will show
Table C1 C2
Message ~[a] n[~] ~t(~] u(~]
Period
1 3 3
If you are a Row player, your history screen will show
Table C1 C2
Message ~[s~l ~[~1 ~[~1 ~[~l
Period
1 3 3
All dollars on hand at the end of the session in excess of S 5.00 aze
yours to keep.
Questiona
Same as Session II Game 1 Questions49
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SESSION II
Came 3
Nessage Space (t M 8)
[The alternative orders of inessage space presentation are in brackets]
This session of the experiment will again consist of a series of separate
decísíon makíng periods. The current session will consist of 20 periods. Each
period will again consist of two phases. In Phase II you will be able to earn
dollars based upon the points you earned in Phase I in exactly the same way you
did in the first session. In Phase I, you will again be paired with another
person and, based upon the choíces you make, you will be able to earn points.
Nowever, Phase I ín this sessian differs from Phase I in the previous
session in the following way:
Specific Instructions for the Column Player
Nessage Stage
After the computer determines the true table, you will be given an
opportunity to send a message, a, 8 or ~. When you send a particular message,
a row player will always receive that message in the same way.
To select the message to send to the Row player, you will be asked:
Vhat would you like to sendT
~r k t [K 8 ~] [8 e ~1
If you choose ~, hold down the shíft key and then hit the a key. If you choose
x, hold down the shift key and then hit the a key. If you choose 8, hold down
the shift key and then hit the 8 key. You may not símultaneously choose any two
or all three messages. Af[er deciding which message to send, you will again be
asked to verify your response.
Actton Stage
After sending your message to the Row player, you will enter the action
stage of Phase I. In this stage, the Row player will choose an actíon whlch will
determine the points you earn and the points the Row player earns for the period.
The Row player wíll have three actions to choose from, R1, R2 or R3. The number
of points you may earn is gíven by the following tables for each action the Row
player might select and each possible payoff table. (Note that these tables
appear with the appropriate label on your screen.)
Number of Points earned by the Column Player
508 C1 508 C2
Rov player'a R1 0 R1 200
action
R2 200 R2 0
R3 400 R3 40050
These tables are constructed in the same manner as the tables in Session I.
Notice that the Likelihood of a given table occurring appears in the upper left
hand corner of each table. Since each table is equally likely, each has a 1 ín
2 chance (508) of occurring. Next, suppose the payoff table drawn was C1 and the
Rov player chose action R2. You would then earn 200 points. Similarly, suppose
the payoff table drawn was C2 and the Row player chose action R2. You would then
earn 0 points. In a like manner, you can use these tables to determine the
number of points you would earn for all other combínations of the Row player's
actions and payoff tables drawn. The Row players also earn points depending upon
the payoff table drawn and the action they select.
Phase I then proceeds in exactly the same way as in the previous session.
Specific Instructions for the Rov Player
As a Row player, you will begin by receiving a message from the Column
player. A particular message from a Column player will always be received by you
in the same way.
You will receive the message:
Ths colvmn player sent: e
or The column playnr sent: e
or The eolumn player sent: t
After receiving this message, you will choose an action. You may choose
actíon R1, R2 or action R3. The number of points you earn is given by the
following tables for each action you might select and each possible payoff table.
(Note that these tables appear with the appropriate label on your sczeen.)
Number of Points earnsd by the Rov Player
S08 C1 S0~ C2
Row player's R1 0
action
R1 700
R2 700 R2 0
R3 400 R3 400
These tables are constructed in the same manner as the tables in Session I.
Notice that the likelihood of a given table occurring appears ín the upper left
hand corner of each table. Since each table is equally líkely, each has a 1 ín
2 chance (508) of occurring. Next, suppose the payoff table drawn vas C1 and you
chose actíon R2. You would then earn 700 points. Similarly, suppose the payoff
table drawn was C2 and you chose action R2. You would then earn 0 points. In
a like manner, you can use these tables to determine the number of points you
would earn for all other combinations of your actions and payoff tables drawn.
The Colwen players also earn points depending upon the payoff table drawn and the
action you select.
Phase I then proceeds in exactly the same way as in the previous session.
Nistory
At the end of each period, a history information screen will display the
payoff tables drawn and messages sent by all the Column players. The history51
screen can be used in the same way as the previous session's hístory screen.
The hístory of the messages sent by the Column players are presented to you in
your own representation of the messages. Thus, hístory informs you of the
frequency with which Column players who drew payoff tables C1 and C2 send
messages ~, ~ and 8. A history sheet will be provided-- on this sheet you are
to record the frequencíes for each perïod.
For instance, suppose that for period 1 in the session, 3 of the Column
players drew cable C1 and 3 drew table C2. The messages sent by the column
players in terms of your own representation of the messages show that all 6 of
the Column players sent ~.
If you are a Column player, your history screen will show [a 8~] (8 ~~]
Table C1 CZ
t ~ 8 ~ ~ 8 Message
Period
1 3 3
If you are a Row player, your hístory screen will show (a 8~] [8
Table C1 Cz
~ ~ 8 t ~ 8 Message
Period
1 3 3
All dollars on hand at the end of the session in excess of S 0.00 are
yours to keep.
Questions
1. When the column player sends a particular message which is represented as ~
to the row player, what message will be received by the row player?
2. When the column player sends a particular message which is represented as ~
to the row player, what message will be received by the row playerl
3. When the column player sends a particular message which is represented as 8
to the row player, vhat message will be received by the row player?
4. Suppose for period 1 in the session, 3 of the column players drew C1 and 3
of the column players drew C2. The messages sent by the column players in
terms of a player's representation of the messages show that all 6 of the
colwnn players send ~.
a. if the player is a column player, what does he`she see on his`her
history ínformation screen [~ 8 ~J(8 ~ ~J52
Table C1 C2




b. if the player is a row player, what does he`she see on his`her
information screen [r t~J(s e e]
Table C1 C2
Message ~ ~ S ~ ~ B
Períod
1
5. Suppose for period 1 in the aession, 3 of the column players drew C1 and 3
of the column players drew C2. The messages sent by the column players in
terms of a player's representation of the messages show that all 6 of the
column players send 8.
a. if the player is a column player, what does he`she see on his`her
history information screen [a 8~J[8 ~ rJ
Table C1 C2
Message ~ a E ~ e e
Period
1
b. if the playar is a rov playsr, what doea he`she see on hís`her
information screen [a ~~][t e wJ
Table C1 C2
Message ~ a e ~
Period
8
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